Self-Knowledge and " Inner Sense ' Lecture I : The Object Perception Model
Self-Knowledge and " Inner Sense ' Lecture I : The Object Perception Model
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自我认识与“内在感觉”讲座一：物体感知模型
DOI：
10.1017/cbo9780511624674.011
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
Sydney Shoemaker
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Sydney Shoemaker
这些讲座的总主题是我们对自己的心理状态的“内省”知识的性质，特别是，这种知识是否应该被认为涉及一种感知，一种“内在感觉”的问题-它是否是在感知或观察模型上适当地构思的。我心目中的知识并不像你所希望的那样，是成功地遵循苏格拉底的训令“认识你自己”而获得的难以获得的知识;它是一种单调的知识，可以用诸如“痒”、“我饿了”、“我不想”和“我很无聊”之类的话来表达。我把这种知识称为“内省的”，当然不是要预先判断它在本质上是感性的还是准感性的问题;正如将变得明显的那样，我自己的观点与这个问题的答案不一致，这个问题的答案是这个术语的词源相当自然地暗示的。面对一个人如何知道某事的问题，我们能得到的最令人满意的答案是“她看到了。“眼见为实，这句话是这样说的，眼见为实是对认知的典型解释。因此，难怪许多人被这样的想法所吸引，
The general topic of these lectures is the nature of our "introspective" knowledge of our own mental states, and, in particular, the question of whether this knowledge should be thought of as involving a kind of perception , an "inner sense"-whether it is appropriately conceived on a perceptual or observational model. The knowledge I have in mind is not, as you perhaps hoped, the difficult-to-get knowledge that arises from successfully following the Socratic injunction "Know thyself"; it is the humdrum kind of knowledge that is expressed in such remarks as "It itches," "I'm hungry ," "I don't want to," and "I'm bored." In calling this knowledge "introspective" I of course do not mean to be prejudging the question of whether it is perceptual or quasi-perceptual in nature; as will become apparent , my own view is at odds with the answer to that question which the etymology of that term rather naturally suggests. Faced with the question of how someone knows something, the most satisfying answer we can be given is "She saw it." Seeing is believing, the expression goes, and seeing is the paradigmatic explanation of knowing. No wonder, then, that many have been attracted by the idea that something like