Can More Information Facilitate Communication?
Can More Information Facilitate Communication?
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2034076
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发表时间：
2012-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Ishida;Takashi Shimizu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Ishida;Takashi Shimizu
本文分析了具有部分信息接收者的廉价谈话模型。与之前的文献形成鲜明对比的是，我们发现有一种情况下，接受者的先验知识增强了通过廉价谈话传达的信息量。在这种情况下，出发点是我们对发送者信息的“双重角色”的明确关注：当接收者自己的私人信息不完全时，发送者的信息提供了关于真实状态的信息，以及关于接收者私人信息的可靠性。这一特征导致了接收者行为的不对称反应，即接收者对真实信息的反应更少，而对虚假信息的反应更多，这对于训练发送者更真实至关重要。
In this paper we analyze a cheap talk model with a partially informed receiver. In clear contrast to the previous literature, we find that there is a case where the receiver's prior knowledge enhances the amount of information conveyed via cheap talk. The point of departure is our explicit focus on the "dual role" of the sender's message in this context: when the receiver has imperfect private information of her own, the sender's message provides information about the true state as well as about the reliability of the receiver's private information. This feature gives rise to the asymmetric response of the receiver's action, where the receiver reacts less to the truthful message and more to the misrepresented one, which is essential in disciplining the sender to be more truthful.