Legislative term limits and state spending
Legislative term limits and state spending
复制标题
立法任期限制和国家支出
DOI：
10.1007/s11127-007-9209-2
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
H. Abbie Erler
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
H. Abbie Erler
立法任期限制的支持者经常声称，这将降低州政府的支出水平。本文使用了美国48个州1977至2001年的财政数据，发现这一论断几乎没有得到支持。相反，这项分析发现，任期限制的州比没有任期限制的州的支出水平更高。这些结果表明，任期限制通过改变制定社会最优财政政策的立法环境，给予立法者更大的激励，使其偏离社会最优财政政策。
Supporters of legislative term limits often claim that they will lower state spending levels. Using fiscal data from 48 states from 1977 to 2001, this paper finds little support for this assertion. Instead, this analysis finds that states with term limits have higher spending levels than states without term limits. These results suggest that term limits give legislators greater incentives to deviate from socially optimal fiscal policy by altering the legislative environment in which such policy is formulated.