A spectrum access game in bidirectional cognitive relay networks
A spectrum access game in bidirectional cognitive relay networks
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DOI：
10.1109/wcsp.2010.5633668
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发表时间：
2010-11
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Wei Zhong;M. Tao;Youyun Xu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Wei Zhong;M. Tao;Youyun Xu
我们考虑一个认知中继网络，其中两个次要用户可以访问未使用的频谱，并通过主用户的帮助下进行双向通信。主用户作为次用户的中继节点，采用放大转发中继策略。当两个次用户选择相同的中继时，使用物理层网络编码。所考虑的系统模型中的频谱接入问题被定义为联合中继选择和离散功率控制。我们制定的问题作为一个非合作博弈的球员是次要用户和共同的回报函数，同时考虑到传输速率和功耗。建议的游戏福尔斯的框架内的潜在的游戏，其中至少有一个纯策略纳什均衡（NE）存在。此外，社会最优解也是所提出的游戏的纯策略NE。然后，我们提出了一个分布式算法的学习自动机的基础上实现的纯策略NE。数值结果表明，该算法具有良好的收敛性和近最优性能。
We consider a cognitive relay network where two secondary users can access the unutilized spectrum and conduct bidirectional communication via the help of primary users. The primary users are regarded as relay nodes of the secondary users and adopt amplify-and-forward relaying strategy. Physical-layer network coding is used when both secondary users select the same relay. The spectrum access problem in the considered system model is defined as joint relay selection and discrete power control. We formulate the problem as a noncooperative game where the players are the secondary users and the common payoff function takes both transmission rate and power consumption into account. The proposed game falls into the framework of potential games where at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) exists. Furthermore, the social optimal solution is also a pure strategy NE of the proposed game. We then propose a distributed algorithm based on learning automata to achieve the pure strategy NE. Numerical results show that the proposed algorithm has good convergence and near optimal performance.