Effect of a large gaming neighborhood and a strategy adaptation neighborhood for bolstering network reciprocity in a prisoner's dilemma game
Effect of a large gaming neighborhood and a strategy adaptation neighborhood for bolstering network reciprocity in a prisoner's dilemma game
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DOI：
10.1088/1742-5468/2014/12/p12024
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发表时间：
2014-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Takashi Ogasawara;J. Tanimoto;Eriko Fukuda;A. Hagishima;N. Ikegaya
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Takashi Ogasawara;J. Tanimoto;Eriko Fukuda;A. Hagishima;N. Ikegaya
在2 × 2囚徒困境（PD）博弈中，网络互惠是增加社会粘性的一种机制，导致合作均衡。在本文中，我们解释了如何在空间PD游戏的游戏社区和策略适应的社区影响网络互惠独立。我们探索了一个适当的范围内的战略适应的邻居，而不是传统的方法，使游戏和战略适应的邻居一致，以提高合作的水平。在扩大游戏社区的情况下，网络互惠性福尔斯下降到相对于传统设置的低水平。在下面基于模拟结果的讨论中，我们将探讨这些增强是如何实现的。从本质上讲，改变邻域的范围会影响合作集群在进化过程中的形成和扩展。
In 2 × 2 prisoner's dilemma (PD) games, network reciprocity is one mechanism for adding social viscosity, leading to a cooperative equilibrium. In this paper, we explain how gaming neighborhoods and strategy-adaptation neighborhoods affect network reciprocity independently in spatial PD games. We explore an appropriate range of strategy adaptation neighborhoods as opposed to the conventional method of making the gaming and strategy adaptation neighborhoods coincide to enhance the level of cooperation. In cases of expanding gaming neighborhoods, network reciprocity falls to a low level relative to the conventional setting. In the discussion below, which is based on the results of our simulation, we explore how these enhancements come about. Essentially, varying the range of the neighborhoods influences how cooperative clusters form and expand in the evolutionary process.