Public health vs. Philip Morris: is it a zero-sum game?
Public health vs. Philip Morris: is it a zero-sum game?
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公共卫生与菲利普·莫里斯：这是一场零和游戏吗？
DOI：
10.1057/palgrave.jphp.3200031
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发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Daynard,RichardA
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Daynard,RichardA
根据具体情况，私人利益和公众健康之间可能存在的关系是一致的（什么促进私人利益和公众的健康），到几乎零和（什么促进利益通常会损害公众的健康）。我说“一般来说”是因为，正如我在下面论证的那样，现实中存在这两种立场的可能例子。以流感疫苗制造商为例。这个w脸红，是一个很好的一致性候选者。流感疫苗的目的是保护接种者，防止她将其传播给其他人。然而，疫苗制造商的目的不同。制造商像所有商业实体一样，希望获得潜在的利润。说服医生和护士向那些总体上不会受益的人推销疫苗，即使没有，也不太可能传播疾病，这会使制造商的利润增加到高于疫苗注射的利润，在生产过程中适当走捷径可能会增加利润，尽管这可能不是一个明智的策略。与潜在竞争对手会面以限制价格上涨（对许多企业来说是一种诱惑）是不可能的。
Depending on the circumstances, the possible re between private interest and the public's health rang congruent (what advances the private interest generall public's health), to almost zero-sum (what advances interest generally hurts the public's health). I say" generally" because, as I argue below, there are proba examples of these two positions in reality. Take the case of a flu vaccine manufacturer. This w blush, be a good candidate for congruence. After purposes of flu vaccine are to protect the recipient fr to keep her from transmitting it to others. However, the vaccine manufacturer is distinct from the purpose The manufacturer, like all commercial entities, wants potential profit. Persuading doctors and nurses to ad vaccine to people who would not on balance benefit would not be likely to transmit the disease even witho would increase the manufacturer's profit above what the vaccine were simply administered appropriatel cutting corners in the production process might incre profits, though it might not be a smart strategy in t And meeting with potential competitors to restric increase price, a temptation for many businesses, is no