Henry More’s Moral Philosophy: Self-Determination and its Limits
Henry More’s Moral Philosophy: Self-Determination and its Limits
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亨利·莫尔的道德哲学:自决及其局限性
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发表时间:
2017
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通讯作者:
S. Hutton
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作者:
S. Hutton
Cambridge Platonist, Henry More (1614–1687), his Enchiridion ethicum (1667), which was translated as An Account of Virtue . Although this book was widely known in More’s time, it is one of his most neglected works today. After outlining the development of More’s moral philosophy, I focus on three aspects of Enchiridion ethicum which give it its distinctive character: More’s emphasis on the role of both reason and the passions; his conception of a ‘boniform faculty’ by which the good may be sensed and enjoyed; and his account of free will as an internal principle of self determination. I highlight More’s distinction between two types of voluntary actions: free actions where the agent is able to exercise choice and necessary actions where the will of the agent is so determined that s/he has no choice.