The evolution of party systems between elections
The evolution of party systems between elections
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DOI：
10.1111/1540-5907.00015
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发表时间：
2003-04-01
影响因子：
4.2
通讯作者：
Benoit, K
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Laver, M;Benoit, K
现有的政党竞争理论大多没有关注政党之间的背叛所导致的政党制度在选举期间的演变。在这篇文章中，我们把个别立法者作为效用最大化的代理人，如果这会增加他们的预期收益，他们会倾向于叛逃到其他政党。我们在这些条款中模拟选举之间的政党制度的演变，并分析讨论这一点，使用计算方法探索未回答的问题。在寻求利益的动机假设下，我们的研究结果突出了最大政党的作用，特别是当它在技术意义上是“主导”的时候，作为一个吸引力极在跨部门的演变。
Most existing theoretical work on party competition pays little attention to the evolution of party systems between elections as a result of defections between parties. In this article, we treat individual legislators as utility-maximizing agents tempted to defect to other parties if this would increase their expected payoffs. We model the evolution of party systems between elections in these terms and discuss this analytically, exploring unanswered questions using computational methods. Under Office-seeking motivational assumptions, our results strikingly highlight the role of the largest party, especially when it is "dominant" in the technical sense, as a pole of attraction in interelectoral evolution.