An Axiomatic Approach to Failures in Contingent Reasoning
An Axiomatic Approach to Failures in Contingent Reasoning
复制标题
解决偶然推理失败的公理方法
DOI：
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发表时间：
2020
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yuta Nakamura
中科院分区：
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作者：
Masaki Miyashita;Yuta Nakamura
本文描述了对 Anscombe-Aumann 行为的乐观和悲观不完全偏好（IPOP），这是一类可能不符合要求决策者偶然思考的公理的偏好顺序。主要结果公理化了比较任何一对不同行为的偏好，当且仅当前者的最小预期效用仍然大于后者的最大预期效用时，一个行为的排名高于另一个行为。这种表述可以自然地解释为决策者在突发事件下的保守态度。当信念集最小时，表示简化为标准 SEU 偏好，同时它封装了明显的优势，即 Li (2017) 提出的决策标准，作为信念集最大时的极地情况。
This paper characterizes incomplete preferences with optimism and pessimism (IPOP) over Anscombe-Aumann acts, a class of preference orders that may fail axioms that require the decision-maker to think contingently. The main result axiomatizes preferences that compare any pair of distinct acts in such a way that an act is ranked higher than another act if and only if the minimal expected utility from the former is still greater than the maximal expected utility from the latter. This representation has a natural interpretation as conservative attitudes of the decision-maker under contingencies. The representation reduces to the standard SEU preferences when belief sets are minimal, while it encapsulates obvious dominance, the decision criterion proposed by Li (2017), as the polar case of when belief sets are maximal.