Self-Defense, Punishing Unjust Combatants and Justice in War
Self-Defense, Punishing Unjust Combatants and Justice in War
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自卫、惩罚不公正的战斗人员和战争正义
DOI：
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发表时间：
2010
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Steve Viner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Steve Viner
一些当代正义战争理论家，如杰夫·麦克马汉（Jeff McMahan），最近建立在个人自卫权的基础上，阐明了与普遍接受的观点相左的战争道德规则。例如，他们认为，原则上，站在不公正一方作战的战斗人员应该仅凭这一点就受到惩罚。此外，他们也反对双方战斗人员在道德上是平等的结论。在本文中，我认为，当涉及到对不公正的战斗人员的惩罚时，这些理论家过度扩展了他们的自卫分析，我展示了在一个重要的意义上，正义和不公正的战斗人员在道德上是平等的。我认为，自卫分析的个人主义和交换条件观点未能正确考虑国际社会在道德上应该如何对待战斗人员，我提出了适用于战争的四个正义要素，它们共同支持这样一个结论，即原则上，国际社会不应该仅仅因为战斗在不公正的一方而采取惩罚战斗人员的行动。
Some contemporary Just War theorists, like Jeff McMahan, have recently built upon an individual right of self-defense to articulate moral rules of war that are at odds with commonly accepted views. For instance, they argue that in principle combatants who fight on the unjust side ought to be liable to punishment on that basis alone. Also, they reject the conclusion that combatants fighting on both sides are morally equal. In this paper, I argue that these theorists overextend their self-defense analysis when it comes to the punishment of unjust combatants, and I show how in an important sense just and unjust combatants are morally equal. I contend that the individualistic and quid pro quo perspective of the self-defense analysis fails to consider properly how the international community, morally speaking, ought to treat combatants, and I set forth four elements of justice applicable to war, which, together, support the conclusion that in principle the international community should not take on the activity of punishing combatants solely for fighting on the unjust side.