Legislator Incentives in a Fragile Democracy: Evidence from Budget Allocation in Thailand
Legislator Incentives in a Fragile Democracy: Evidence from Budget Allocation in Thailand
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脆弱民主中的立法者激励：来自泰国预算分配的证据
DOI：
10.1111/j.1465-7287.2010.00229.x
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Kawaura
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Kawaura
本文探讨了在一个脆弱的民主国家的立法者是否有着与成熟民主国家的政治家相同的地方利益寻求动机。新兴民主国家的特点是对民主制度的生存存在不确定性，这可能会阻碍民选官员的连任努力，而倾向于采取更直接的措施来获得个人回报。对泰国76个省的立法代表性与预算分配之间关系的分析表明，泰国立法者正在将政府支出用于其家乡省份。这一结果表明，即使在一个年轻、脆弱的民主国家，政治家的自利动机也发挥着重要的分配作用。
This article investigates if legislators in a fragile democracy share the same local benefit seeking incentives that are observed among politicians in mature democracies. Fledgling democracies are characterized by uncertainty over the survival of democratic institutions, which may discourage elected officials' reelection effort in favor of more direct measures to gain personal payoffs. Analyses of the relationship between legislative representation and the allocation of the budget among Thailand's 76 provinces indicate that Thai legislators are directing government expenditure to their home provinces. This result suggests that politicians' self‐serving motives play an important allocation role even in a young, fragile democracy.