There Is Just One Idea of Self in Hume's Treatise
There Is Just One Idea of Self in Hume's Treatise
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休谟的论文中只有一种自我观念
DOI：
10.1353/hms.2009.0015
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Åsa Carlson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Åsa Carlson
休谟的神秘的话，“我们必须区分人格同一性，因为它涉及我们的思想或想象，因为它涉及我们的激情或我们对自己的关注”一直是各种不同解释的焦点，有些比其他更具创造性。但是，这个解释问题的解决办法确实非常简单，简单到大多数读者都想不起来。休谟所想的其实只是联想的不同运作方式，一方面是想象，另一方面是激情。因此，人们可以很容易地把整个《论人格同一性》理解为只包含一个自我观念，即《论人格同一性》中讨论的知觉束。与许多学者最近提出的相反，这种观念很可能是自我在同情机制中发挥作用的“观念，或者更确切地说是印象”，也是骄傲和谦卑的对象。这种忠实但枯燥的阅读使休谟条理清晰，可能比任何两个概念的解释都更连贯。
Hume's mysterious words, "we must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves" have been the focus of a variety of different interpretations, some more creative than others. But the solution to this interpretative problem is indeed very simple, too simple to occur to most readers. What Hume has in mind is actually nothing but the different ways association works with regard to, on the one hand, imagination, and, on the other hand, passion. Hence, one may easily read the entire Treatise as containing just one idea of self, that is, the bundle of perceptions discussed in "On personal identity." Contrary to what many scholars have recently suggested, this idea may very well be "the idea, or rather impression" of self at play in the mechanism of sympathy, as well as the object of pride and humility. This faithful but dull reading makes Hume coherent, probably more coherent than any two-ideas interpretation does.