Article title: An Analysis of Airport-Airline Vertical Relationships with Risk Sharing Contracts under Asymmetric Information Structures
Article title: An Analysis of Airport-Airline Vertical Relationships with Risk Sharing Contracts under Asymmetric Information Structures
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文章标题：非对称信息结构下机场-航空公司纵向关系与风险分担契约分析
DOI：
10.1016/j.trc.2014.02.003
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Katsuya Hihara
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
羽山伸一;落合和彦;名切幸枝;中西せつ子;石井奈穂美;加藤卓也;今野文治;近江俊徳;土田修一;川本芳;羽山伸一;Katsuya Hihara
本文分析了合资型机场-航空公司纵向关系中的双重道德风险问题，即双方都为合资企业做出了努力，但双方都看不到对方的努力。利用连续时间随机动态规划模型，我们证明了在非常严格的条件下，即，在最优努力成本可忽略且风险厌恶参数均渐近于零的情况下，纵向契约可以看作是最优分担规则，它是最终状态的线性函数，斜率是生产率差异和不确定性的乘积（扩散率）水平指数。如果双方的生产率相同，或者底层过程的扩散率为1，最优线性分担规则不依赖于最终状态。如果他们的条件不依赖于最终状态是对称的，那么风险分担完全消失。在数值例子中，我们说明了复杂的影响的不确定性增加和期末负荷因子的改善最优共享规则，和相对简单的影响总效用水平。
We analyze the double moral hazard problem at the joint venture type airport–airline vertical relationship, where two parties both contribute efforts to the joint venture but neither of them can see the other’s efforts. With the continuous-time stochastic dynamic programming model, we show that by the de-centralized utility maximizations of two parties under very strict conditions, i.e., optimal efforts’ cost being negligible and their risk averse parameters both asymptotically approaching to zero, the vertical contract could be agreed as the optimal sharing rule, which is the linear function of the final state with the slope being the product of their productivity difference and uncertainty (diffusion rate) level index.If both parties’ productivities are same, or the diffusion rate of the underlying process is unity, optimal linear sharing rule do not depend on the final state. If their conditions not dependent on final state are symmetric as well, then risk sharing disappears completely. In numerical examples, we illustrate the complex impact of uncertainty increase and end-of-period load factor improvement on the optimal sharing rule, and the relatively simple impact on total utility levels.