Reasoning and Regress
Reasoning and Regress
复制标题
推理与回归
作者：
Markos Valaris
回归论证使许多人相信，推理不需要关于什么从什么得出什么的信念。在本文中，我认为这是一个错误。回归论证基于对推理本质的可疑（尽管根深蒂固）假设--最突出的是，假设通过推理相信p只是相信p具有正确的因果祖先。我提出了另一种解释，根据这种解释，关于什么来自什么的信念在推理中起着构成性的作用。
Regress arguments have convinced many that reasoning cannot require beliefs about what follows from what. In this paper I argue that this is a mistake. Regress arguments rest on dubious (although deeply entrenched) assumptions about the nature of reasoning � most prominently, the assumption that believing p by reasoning is simply a matter of having a belief in p with the right causal ancestry. I propose an alternative account, according to which beliefs about what follows from what play a constitutive role in reasoning.