Preferential Trade Agreements and Multilateral Tariff Cooperation
Preferential Trade Agreements and Multilateral Tariff Cooperation
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优惠贸易协定和多边关税合作
DOI：
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kamal Saggi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kamal Saggi
优惠贸易协定（PTA）是多边贸易自由化的基石还是绊脚石？我解决这个问题的无限重复的关税博弈中的三个国家从事产业内贸易的寡头垄断。核心的结果是，当国家是对称的，自由贸易协定（FTA）破坏多边关税合作的不利影响的合作激励的非成员国，而关税同盟（CU）这样做，通过其对成员国的合作激励的影响。但是，当各国在市场规模或成本方面不对称时，存在优惠贸易协定促进多边关税合作的情况。
Are preferential trade agreements (PTAs) building or stumbling blocks for multilateral trade liberalization? I address this question in an infinitely repeated tariff game between three countries engaged in intraindustry trade under oligopoly. The central result is that when countries are symmetric, a free trade agreement (FTA) undermines multilateral tariff cooperation by adversely affecting the cooperation incentive of the nonmember whereas a customs union (CU) does so via its effect on the cooperation incentives of members. However, when countries are asymmetric with respect to either market size or cost, there exist circumstances where PTAs facilitate multilateral tariff cooperation.