The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms
The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms
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和平的不稳定本质：解决问题、执行和解以及重新谈判条款
DOI：
10.2307/2991840
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发表时间：
1999
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Werner
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
S. Werner
在这篇文章中，我确定了战后不稳定和和平解决失败的三种解释，并从每个角度测试假设。第一种解释认为，未能解决争议问题是不稳定的主要根源。第二种解释突出了众所周知的执行问题，这一问题在无政府环境中常常困扰着协定。最后一个论点考虑了交战各方重新谈判解决方案条款的动机。使用一个风险模型，我测试的假设来自每一个解释与数据之间的和平时期的对偶以前在1816年和1992年之间的战争。我发现决议论点几乎没有得到支持，只有混合支持的执行论点，和更一致的支持重新谈判的论点。
In this article, I identify three explanations for postwar instability and the failure of peace settlements and test hypotheses derived from each perspective. The first explanation identifies the failure to resolve the issues in dispute as a key source of instability. The second explanation highlights the well-known problem of enforcement that often plagues agreements in an anarchic environment. The final argument considers the belligerents' incentives to renegotiate the terms of the settlement. Using a hazard model, I test hypotheses derived from each explanation with data on the duration of peace between dyads formerly at war between 1816 and 1992. I find little support for the resolution argument, only mixed support for the enforcement argument, and much more consistent support for the renegotiation argument.