War and the Cycle of Relative Power
War and the Cycle of Relative Power
复制标题
战争与相对权力循环
DOI：
10.2307/1954315
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发表时间：
1980
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
W. Parsons
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Doran;W. Parsons
相对的民族国家能力在很长一段时间内遵循一个广义的非线性模式。经验证据表明，在1816年至1975年间，九个大国至少经历了政治崛起、成熟和衰落的相对能力周期的一部分。一国相对能力动态的具体变化增加了其发动广泛战争的倾向。无论战争的广泛性是根据持续时间、强度还是规模来定义的，大国都有可能在相对能力曲线的关键拐点和转折点上发起更广泛的战争，在这些拐点上，政府和社会所持有的线性角色观念发生了普遍变化。这种分析涉及了一个新的理论焦点，用于研究战争的原因，将注意力从国家之间的相互作用转移到相对权力变化的后果以及民族国家本身的政治演变上。
Relative nation-state capability follows a generalized nonlinear pattern over long periods. Empirical evidence indicates that between 1816–1975 nine major powers have traversed at least a segment of this relative capability cycle of political ascendancy, maturation and decline. Specific changes in a state's relative capability dynamics increase its propensity to initiate extensive war. Whether the extensiveness of a war is defined in terms of duration, intensity or magnitude, major powers are likely to initiate more extensive wars at the critical inflection and turning points on the curve of relative capability where the linear role perceptions held by government and society change pervasively. This analysis involves a new theoretical focus for examining the causes of war, shifting attention from interactions between nations to the consequences of changes in relative power and to the political evolution of the nation-state itself.