How to use indistinguishability obfuscation: deniable encryption, and more
How to use indistinguishability obfuscation: deniable encryption, and more
复制标题
DOI：
10.1145/2591796.2591825
复制
发表时间：
2014-05
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Sahai;Brent Waters
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Sahai;Brent Waters
我们引入了一种新的技术，我们称之为打孔程序，适用于加密问题的不可否认性混淆。我们使用这种技术进行了系统的研究的适用性的不可否认的混淆各种密码学的目标。沿着这条路，我们解决了Canetti、Dwork、Naor和Ostrovsky在1997年提出的长达16年的可否认加密的公开问题：在可否认加密中，一个被迫向对手透露她的消息和她用于加密的随机性的发送者应该能够令人信服地提供“假”随机性，可以解释她想要假装发送的任何替代消息。我们解决这个问题，给出了第一个可否认的加密，不需要任何预先规划的一方，以后必须发出一个拒绝的建设。此外，我们还展示了我们的穿孔程序技术的一般性，通过构建各种核心加密对象的不可分割性混淆和单向函数（或接近的变体）。特别地，我们获得：公钥加密、短“散列和签名”选择性安全签名、选择密文安全公钥加密、非交互式零知识证明（NIZK）、单射陷门函数和不经意传输。这些结果表明，不可逆混淆成为密码学的“中心枢纽”的可能性。
We introduce a new technique, that we call punctured programs, to apply indistinguishability obfuscation towards cryptographic problems. We use this technique to carry out a systematic study of the applicability of indistinguishability obfuscation to a variety of cryptographic goals. Along the way, we resolve the 16-year-old open question of Deniable Encryption, posed by Canetti, Dwork, Naor, and Ostrovsky in 1997: In deniable encryption, a sender who is forced to reveal to an adversary both her message and the randomness she used for encrypting it should be able to convincingly provide "fake" randomness that can explain any alternative message that she would like to pretend that she sent. We resolve this question by giving the first construction of deniable encryption that does not require any pre-planning by the party that must later issue a denial. In addition, we show the generality of our punctured programs technique by also constructing a variety of core cryptographic objects from indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions (or close variants). In particular we obtain: public key encryption, short "hash-and-sign" selectively secure signatures, chosen-ciphertext secure public key encryption, non-interactive zero knowledge proofs (NIZKs), injective trapdoor functions, and oblivious transfer. These results suggest the possibility of indistinguishability obfuscation becoming a "central hub" for cryptography.