Do Bank-affiliated Analysts Benefit from Lending Relationships?
Do Bank-affiliated Analysts Benefit from Lending Relationships?
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1475-679x.2011.00399.x
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发表时间：
2011-01
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ting Chen;Xiumin Martin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Ting Chen;Xiumin Martin
本文研究了来自贷款活动的私人信息是否提高了银行附属分析师的预测准确性。使用匹配的样本设计，匹配的关联银行或借款人，我们证明了银行关联的分析师的预测准确性增加后，以下公司从关联银行借款。我们还发现，预测准确性的增加是更明显的借款人与更大的信息不对称，衡量公司规模和标准差的分析师共识预测，以及借款人的坏消息和高信用风险。总的来说，我们的证据表明，信息从商业银行流向金融集团内部的股票研究部门。
This paper investigates whether private information from lending activities improves the forecast accuracy of bank-affiliated analysts. Using a matched sample design, matching by affiliated bank or borrower, we demonstrate that the forecast accuracy of bank-affiliated analysts increases after the followed firm borrows from the affiliated bank. We also find that the increase in forecast accuracy is more pronounced for borrowers with greater information asymmetry, as measured by firm size and the standard deviation of analyst consensus forecasts, and for borrowers with bad news and high credit risk. Overall our evidence suggests that information flows from commercial banking to equity research divisions within financial conglomerates.