Green Electricity Markets as Mechanisms of Public-Goods Provision: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Green Electricity Markets as Mechanisms of Public-Goods Provision: Theory and Experimental Evidence
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绿色电力市场作为公共产品提供机制：理论和实验证据
DOI：
10.1007/s10640-017-0136-5
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发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Moore
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Mitra;M. Moore
基于公用事业的绿色电力计划为消费者提供了减少其电力使用的碳足迹的市场机会。这些计划部署了三种类型的公共产品贡献机制：自愿贡献、绿色关税和全有或全无的绿色关税（Kotchen和摩尔，2007年）。我们扩展了对全有或全无的绿色关税机制的理论理解，表明需要假设暖光偏好来解释部署该机制的计划的广泛参与。我们进行了第一次实验测试，以比较纯公共产品（基于自愿捐款机制）和不纯公共产品（基于绿色关税机制）的创收能力。在实验性的游戏中，自愿贡献机制比绿色关税机制多筹集50%的收入。在“要么全有要么全无”的绿色关税下，实验游戏和回归估计表明，暖光偏好会积极影响参与，正如理论所预测的那样。
Utility-based green electricity programs provide market opportunities for consumers to reduce the carbon footprint of their electricity use. These programs deploy three types of public-goods contribution mechanisms: voluntary contribution, green tariff, and all-or-nothing green tariff (Kotchen and Moore, 2007). We extend the theoretical understanding of the all-or-nothing green tariff mechanism by showing that an assumption of warm-glow preferences is needed to explain widespread participation in programs deploying this mechanism. We conduct the first experimental test to compare the revenue generating capacity of a pure public good (based on the voluntary contribution mechanism) and an impure public good (based on the green tariff mechanism). In experimental play, the voluntary contribution mechanism raises 50% more revenue than the green tariff mechanism. With the all-or-nothing green tariff, experimental play and regression estimates show that a warm-glow preference positively affects participation, as predicted by the theory.