Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights
Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights
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DOI：
10.1093/restud/rdv003
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发表时间：
2015-04
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Daniel Krähmer;Roland Strausz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Daniel Krähmer;Roland Strausz
我们在标准序贯筛选模型中引入了事后参与约束。这体现了消费者撤销权的存在，例如，欧洲联盟关于“远程销售合同”的条例规定了这种权利。有了这些额外的约束，最优的合同是静态的，不像只有事先参与的约束，不引出代理人的信息顺序。只要事前和事后外部选项的差异低于正上限，这一点就成立。强制退出权的福利效果是模糊的。由于它是不够的，在我们的设置只考虑当地的激励约束，我们开发了一种新的技术，以确定相关的全球约束。
We introduce ex post participation constraints in the standard sequential screening model. This captures the presence of consumer withdrawal rights as, for instance, mandated by European Union regulation of “distance sales contracts”. With such additional constraints, the optimal contract is static and, unlike with only ex ante participation constraints, does not elicit the agent's information sequentially. This holds whenever differences in ex ante and ex post outside options are below a positive upper bound. Welfare effects of mandatory withdrawal rights are ambiguous. Since it is insufficient in our setting to consider only local incentive constraints, we develop a novel technique to identify the relevant global constraints.