Social Welfare and Wage Inequality in Search Equilibrium with Personal Contacts
Social Welfare and Wage Inequality in Search Equilibrium with Personal Contacts
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2026183
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发表时间：
2011-12
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
A. Zaharieva
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Zaharieva
本文将通过个人接触的工作搜索纳入一个隔离劳动力市场的均衡匹配模型。公司可以在正规的就业市场上发布工资，或者他们可以节省广告费用，依靠口碑传播。然后，公司和申请人之间进行事后工资谈判，因此该模型可以根据议价能力参数产生工资溢价或罚款。此外，本文还表明，传统的Hosios（1990）条件在有家庭联系的经济中仍然成立，但在弱联系的经济中无法提供效率。效率低下有两个原因。首先，工人讨价还价的工资不内化的积极外部影响，他们的接触，源于更高的概率找到工作。这种网络外部性给工资带来了上行压力，因此推荐市场的市场紧张度被向下扭曲。第二，弱关系并不完全符合失业工人的利益，因此他们的搜索强度低。最后，本文表明，雇用补贴和推荐奖金的组合可以分散在弱联系经济中的有效配置。
This paper incorporates job search through personal contacts into an equilibrium matching model with a segregated labor market. Firms can post wage offers in the regular job market, alternatively they can save on advertising costs and rely on word-of-mouth communication. Wages are then negotiated ex-post between the firm and the applicant, so the model can generate wage premiums or penalties depending on the parameter of bargaining power. Moreover, this paper shows that the traditional Hosios (1990) condition continues to hold in an economy with family contacts but it fails to provide efficiency in the economy with weak ties. There are two reasons for the inefficiency. First, workers bargaining over wages do not internalize the positive external effect on their contacts, originating from a higher probability of finding a job. This network externality puts an upward pressure on wages so the market tightness in the referral market is distorted downwards. Second, weak ties do not act in full interest of the unemployed worker so their search intensity is inefficiently low. Finally, this paper shows that a combination of a hiring subsidy and a referral bonus can decentralize the efficient allocation in the economy with weak ties.