AN ECONOMIC-THEORY OF POLITICAL-ACTION IN A DEMOCRACY
AN ECONOMIC-THEORY OF POLITICAL-ACTION IN A DEMOCRACY
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DOI：
10.1086/257897
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发表时间：
1957-01-01
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
DOWNS, A
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
DOWNS, A
尽管政府决策在经济生活的每一个阶段都是如此，但经济理论家们从来没有成功地将政府与私人决策者结合在一个单一的一般均衡理论中。相反，他们将政府行为视为外生变量，由经济学范围之外的政治考虑决定。这种观点实际上是从古典前提的延续，即私营部门是一种自我调节机制，任何超出维持法律和秩序的政府行为都是对私营部门的”干预”，而不是私营部门的固有部分。[2]然而，至少在两个经济理论领域，政府行为的中心地位迫使经济学家制定规则，指出政府”应该”如何做出决策。因此，在公共财政领域，休·道尔顿说：由于公共财政的运作，所产生的财富的数量和性质发生了变化，财富在个人和阶级之间的分配也发生了变化。这些变化的总体影响对社会有利吗？如果是，则操作合理;如果不是，则不合理。的
tance of government decisions in every phase of economic life, economic theorists have never successfully integrated government with private decision-makers in a single general equilibrium theory. Instead they have treated government action as an exogenous variable, determined by political considerations that lie outside the purview of economics. This view is really a carry-over from the classical premise that the private sector is a self-regulating mechanism and that any government action beyond maintenance of law and order is" interference" with it rather than an intrinsic part of it. 2 However, in at least two fields of economic theory, the centrality of government action has forced economists to formulate rules that indicate how government" should" make decisions. Thus in the field of public finance, Hugh Dalton states:As a result of [the] operations of public finance, changes take place in the amount and in the nature of the wealth which is produced, and in the distribution of that wealth among individuals and classes. Are these changes in their aggregate effects socially advantageous? If so the operations are justified; if not, not. The