Sensing nanosecond-scale voltage attacks and natural transients in FPGAs
Sensing nanosecond-scale voltage attacks and natural transients in FPGAs
复制标题
感测 FPGA 中的纳秒级电压攻击和自然瞬态
DOI：
10.1145/2435264.2435283
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发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. French
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
K. Zick;Meeta Srivastav;Wei Zhang;M. French
电压噪声不仅降低可靠性和性能，而且还被用来攻击系统安全。大多数系统完全不知道纳秒时间尺度上发生的波动。本文量化了基于 FPGA 的系统面临的威胁并提出了解决方案。对 28nm FPGA 瞬态的新颖测量表明，结构中的极端活动可能会导致巨大的下冲和过冲，比规范允许的值大 10 倍以上。对现有的电压传感器进行评估并发现其不足。最后，提出了一种使用可重构逻辑的传感器设计；其时间数字转换器的采样率比 28nm Xilinx ADC 快 500 倍。这样可以快速表征通常无法检测到的瞬态，从而为系统优化提供潜在有用的数据，并帮助防御电源电压攻击。
Voltage noise not only detracts from reliability and performance, but has been used to attack system security. Most systems are completely unaware of fluctuations occurring on nanosecond time scales. This paper quantifies the threat to FPGA-based systems and presents a solution approach. Novel measurements of transients on 28nm FPGAs show that extreme activity in the fabric can cause enormous undershoot and overshoot, more than 10× larger than what is allowed by the specification. An existing voltage sensor is evaluated and shown to be insufficient. Lastly, a sensor design using reconfigurable logic is presented; its time-to-digital converter enables sample rates 500× faster than the 28nm Xilinx ADC. This enables quick characterization of transients that would normally go undetected, thereby providing potentially useful data for system optimization and helping to defend against supply voltage attacks.