The Persistent Power of Human Rights: Human rights in areas of limited statehood
The Persistent Power of Human Rights: Human rights in areas of limited statehood
复制标题
人权的持久力量：有限国家地区的人权
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2013
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
T. Risse
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Tanja A. Börzel;T. Risse
《人权的力量》（PoHR; Risse et al.，1999）提出了一个人权变化的螺旋模型，该模型始于四个隐含的、相互关联的假设：侵犯人权的国家是巩固的国家，它们既享有对暴力手段的垄断，又有能力做出并充分执行中央政治决策。不自由政权故意侵犯人权，这是因为它们想要这样做，而不是因为它们缺乏遵守国际准则的能力。侵犯人权者大多是国家行为者。（跨国）非国家行为者通过向国家行为者施加压力，促使它们采纳和执行规范，并使它们适应新的规范，从而促进对国际人权的遵守。这些假设适用于PoHR及以后讨论的案例（见第2章）。但它们并不适合“有限国家地区”，即国家政府不控制暴力手段和/或无法实施或执行包括法律在内的中央决定的领土或职能空间。我们在下文中认为，在当代国际体系中，巩固的国家地位形成了例外而不是规则，并且“有限国家地位的地区”比通常假设的更普遍（见Risse 2011 b; Risse and Lehmkuhl 2007）。特别是，国家地位有限的地区并不局限于脆弱、失败或失败的国家，而是当今世界体系中大多数发展中国家的特征。
The Power of Human Rights (PoHR; Risse et al. 1999) developed a spiral model of human rights change that started from four implicit and interrelated assumptions: Human rights-violating states are consolidated states that enjoy both the monopoly over the means of violence and the ability to make and fully implement central political decisions. Illiberal regimes violate human rights intentionally, that is, because they want to, not because they lack the capacity to comply with international norms. Rights-violating perpetrators are state actors for the most part. (Transnational) non-state actors promote compliance with international human rights by pressuring state actors towards norm adoption and implementation and by socializing them into the new norms, respectively. These assumptions are valid for the cases discussed in PoHR and beyond (see Chapter 2). But they do not fit “areas of limited statehood,” i.e. territorial or functional spaces in which national governments do not control the means of violence and/or are incapable to implement or enforce central decisions including the law. We argue in the following that consolidated statehood forms the exception rather than the rule in the contemporary international system and that “areas of limited statehood” are more widespread than is commonly assumed (see Risse 2011b; Risse and Lehmkuhl 2007). In particular, areas of limited statehood are not confined to fragile, failing or failed states, but characterize most developing countries in the current world system.