Comparative metaphysics: the development of representing natural and normative regularities in human and non-human primates
Comparative metaphysics: the development of representing natural and normative regularities in human and non-human primates
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DOI：
10.1007/s11097-014-9406-7
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发表时间：
2014-11
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
H. Rakoczy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
H. Rakoczy
人类的孩子是如何以最普遍和抽象的结构来划分和思考周围世界的？其他动物（特别是非人类灵长类动物）所共有的这些观察世界的一般形式在多大程度上是相同的？为了回答这些所谓的比较形而上学的问题，本文讨论了来自发展和比较研究的新证据，以论证以下图景：人类儿童和非人类灵长类动物共享自然本体论的基本框架：他们以本质主义的方式根据由其基本属性构成的自然类对象以及受一般描述规律支配的通用术语来思考他们的自然环境。相比之下，人类儿童和非人类灵长类动物如何划分他们的社会环境存在很大分歧：只有人类儿童继续使用他们的本质主义和通用思维来发展独特的社会本体论，以受一般规定规范支配的社会构成的对象来构想他们的周围环境。
How do human children come up to carve up and think of the world around them in its most general and abstract structure? And to which degree are these general forms of viewing the world shared by other animals, notably by non-human primates? In response to these questions of what could be called comparative metaphysics, this paper discusses new evidence from developmental and comparative research to argue for the following picture: human children and non-human primates share a basic framework of natural ontology: they think about their natural surroundings in essentialist ways in terms of natural kind objects constituted by their essential properties, and in generic terms as governed by general descriptive regularities. In contrast, there is a great divide when it comes to how human children and non-human primates carve up their social environment: only human children then go on to use their essentialist and generic thinking for developing a distinctively social ontology, to conceive of their surrounding in terms of socially constituted objects governed by general prescriptive norms.