Balanced externalities and the proportional allocation of nonseparable contributions
Balanced externalities and the proportional allocation of nonseparable contributions
复制标题
平衡的外部性和不可分离捐款的比例分配
DOI：
10.1016/j.ejor.2022.10.017
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发表时间：
2023
影响因子：
6.4
通讯作者：
Zou Zhengxing
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
van den Brink Rene;Chun Youngsub;Funaki Yukihiko;Zou Zhengxing
在本文中，我们研究的意义，扩展的平衡成本降低属性从决策问题一般的游戏。作为均衡成本降低属性的直接翻译，博弈解的均衡外部性公理要求任何参与者的收益等于她的存在对其他参与者造成的总外部性。我们证明了这个公理和效率一起刻画了2-加法博弈的Shapley值。然而，将这一公理直接推广到一般的博弈是与效率不相容的。为了尽可能接近平衡外部性背后的思想，我们通过要求每个参与者的收益与其对其他参与者造成的总外部性的比例相同来削弱这一公理。这种弱化，我们称之为弱均衡外部性，结果证明与效率是相容的。更具体地说，满足这一较弱性质的唯一有效解决方案是按比例分配不可分离贡献（PANSCs）价值，它将总价值与参与者的可分离成本成比例分配。我们还提供了PANSCs值的特征，使用减少游戏的一致性公理。
In this paper, we study the implications of extending the balanced cost reduction property from queueing problems to general games. As a direct translation of the balanced cost reduction property, the axiom of balanced externalities for solutions of games, requires that the payoff of any player is equal to the total externality she inflicts on the other players with her presence. We show that this axiom and efficiency together characterize the Shapley value for 2-additive games. However, extending this axiom in a straightfoward way to general games is incompatible with efficiency. Keeping as close as possible to the idea behind balanced externalities, we weaken this axiom by requiring that every player's payoff is the same fraction of its total externality inflicted on the other players. This weakening, which we call weak balanced externalities, turns out to be compatible with efficiency. More specifically, the unique efficient solution that satisfies this weaker property is the proportional allocation of nonseparable contribution (PANSC) value, which allocates the total worth proportional to the separable costs of the players. We also provide characterizations of the PANSC value using a reduced game consistency axiom.