Assessment-Sensitivity: The Manifestation Challenge

Assessment-Sensitivity: The Manifestation Challenge
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评估敏感性:表现挑战

DOI:
10.1111/phpr.12262
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发表时间:
2016
影响因子:
1.5
通讯作者:
Wright C
Wright C
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--
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作者:
Wright C

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麦克法兰在这本影响深远、制作精良的书中,其核心内容是为以下观点辩护:关于真理,存在一种理论上值得尊敬、有趣、有用的相对主义——他将这种相对主义称为“评估敏感性”。然而,评估敏感性在三个重要方面与经典的真理相对主义(如果真有这种东西的话)形成了对比。首先,它可能是话语的一种局部特征。与普罗泰哥拉不同,麦克法兰并没有对真理的形而上学提出一般性的主张。因此,他对真理相对主义的一致性进行了广泛的传统关注,从《泰阿泰德》开始,这使它成为一个全球性的论题(因此,例如,自我适用)。其次,传统的相对真理是态度内容的一种属性,而评价敏感性则是标记断言话语的一种特征——尽管麦克法兰允许它衍生地应用于由此表达的命题(他以通常的直觉方式将其理解为断言的东西,相信的东西,维持不相容和蕴涵关系的东西,等等)。最后,麦克法兰的计划被用于为实际实践的话语的某些区域提供描述性充分的语义理论的任务,而不是,至少在第一个实例中,用于任何具体的形而上学争议。传统上,真理相对主义是关于现实主义和客观性的规范性辩论中的一个参与者,是一种反现实主义的范式,与非认知主义、错误理论、表现主义等并列并形成对比,而且在现代(20世纪)的辩论中,这种范式在很大程度上被抛弃了。麦克法兰似乎无意直接参与这些辩论。
MacFarlane’s core project in his deep-reaching, superbly crafted book is the defence of the claim that there is a theoretically respectable, interesting, useful species of relativism about truth—the species he captions by the term, assessment-sensitivity. Assessmentsensitivity contrasts, however, with classic truth relativism—if indeed there is such a thing—in three important respects. First, it is potentially a local feature of discourses. MacFarlane, unlike Protagoras, is making no general claim about the metaphysics of truth. So he finesses a broad sweep of traditional concerns about the coherence of truthrelativism, from the Theaetetus onwards, which take it to be a global thesis (so hence, eg, self-applicable). Second, whereas traditional relative truth is a property of the contents of attitudes, assessment-sensitivity is a characteristic in the first instance of token assertoric utterances—though MacFarlane allows it to apply derivatively to the propositions expressed thereby (which he understands in the usual intuitive way as what are asserted, what are believed, what sustain relations of incompatibility and entailment, and so on). 1 Finally, MacFarlane’s project is harnessed to the task of giving descriptively adequate semantic theories for certain regions of discourse as actually practiced, rather than, at least in the first instance, to any specifically metaphysical controversies. Traditionally, truth-relativism is a player in the normative debates about realism and objectivity, one kind of paradigm of anti-realism, alongside and contrasting with non-cognitivism, error-theory, expressivism and the rest—and indeed a paradigm that in the modern (20th century) debates was largely discarded. MacFarlane, as it appears, intends no direct contribution to those debates.
新时代相对主义和认识可能性:证据问题1
DOI: 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2007.00133.x
发表时间: 2007
影响因子: 0.7
作者:
C. Wright
通讯作者: C. Wright