Assertion
Assertion
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断言
DOI：
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199573004.003.0001
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发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Brown J
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Brown J
这本书源于2007年6月在苏格兰圣安德鲁斯的Arché哲学研究中心举行的一次关于断言的会议。这次会议和这本书的目的是汇集领先的认识论和语言哲学家在断言方面的新工作。虽然断言主题是认识论和语言哲学的核心，但这两个领域的工作还没有充分整合。这本书的一个主要目的是促进认识论学者和研究断言的语言哲学家之间加强互动。语言哲学中关于断言的许多工作的主要焦点一直是对被理解为某种类型的言语行为的断言的解释。人们提供了各种可能的解释，包括断言是由某些规范、或其影响(例如，在对话的共同基础上)、或其承诺、或其原因(如它所表达的精神状态)个性化的观点。第二个相关的问题是，如果真理的相对主义是正确的，那么如何理解断言的言语行为。一些人使用相对论的观点来为这样或那样的断言辩护。其他人则将在相对论框架内提供断言的困难作为反对相对主义的论据。在认识论中，断言是关于证言和知识性质的辩论的核心。认识论特别感兴趣的观点是，断言是由一种规范来管理的，该规范对适当的断言强加了认识性要求。威廉姆森最近为这一观点提供了一个有影响力的辩护，他认为断言与其他言语行为的区别在于遵循以下独特的构成规则：一个人必须：只有当一个人知道p时，才能断言p(Williamson 1996)。根据最近的发展，知识规范不仅支配断言，而且支配实践推理(例如，霍桑2004；霍桑和斯坦利2008)。如果知识是断言或实际推理的标准，那么解释知识的一个标准是它应该尊重
This volume originated in a conference on assertion held at the Arché Philosophical Research Centre, St Andrews, Scotland in June 2007. The aim of the conference and of this resulting volume was to bring together new work on assertion by leading epistemologists and philosophers of language. Although the topic of assertion is central to both epistemology and the philosophy of language, work in these two areas is insufficiently integrated. One main aim of the volume is to foster increased interaction between epistemologists and philosophers of language working on assertion. The primary focus of much work on assertion within the philosophy of language has been to provide an account of assertion understood as a certain type of speech act. A variety of potential accounts has been offered, including the ideas that assertion is individuated by certain norms, or by its effects (for instance, on the common ground of the conversation), or by its commitments, or by its causes, such as the mental state it expresses. A second related issue is how to understand the speech act of assertion if relativism about truth is correct. Some have used relativistic views to defend one or other account of assertion. Others have used the difficulty in providing an account of assertion within a relativistic framework as an argument against relativism. Within epistemology, assertion is central to debates concerning testimony and the nature of knowledge. Epistemologists have been especially interested in the idea that assertion is governed by a norm that imposes epistemic requirements on appropriate assertion. A recent influential defense of this view is provided by Williamson, who argues that assertion is distinguished from other speech acts by being subject to the following unique constitutive rule—one must: assert p only if one knows that p (Williamson 1996). According to a more recent development, the knowledge norm governs not only assertion but also practical reasoning (eg Hawthorne 2004; Hawthorne and Stanley 2008). If knowledge is the norm for either assertion or practical reasoning, then one criterion for an account of knowledge is that it should respect these links between