A safety/security risk analysis approach of Industrial Control Systems: A cyber bowtie - combining new version of attack tree with bowtie analysis

A safety/security risk analysis approach of Industrial Control Systems: A cyber bowtie - combining new version of attack tree with bowtie analysis
复制标题

DOI:
10.1016/j.cose.2017.09.004
复制
发表时间:
2018-01-01
影响因子:
5.6
通讯作者:
Masse, F.
Masse, F.
中科院分区:
计算机科学3区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Abdo, H.;Kaouk, M.;Masse, F.

文献摘要

被引文献

相似文献

在流程工业中引入互联系统和数字技术会产生新的网络安全漏洞,这些漏洞可能被复杂的威胁所利用,并导致不良的安全事故。因此,在风险分析过程中识别这些脆弱性成为有效的工业风险评估的重要组成部分。然而,如今,安全和安全在不应该被分开分析的时候被分开分析。这是因为安全威胁可能导致与安全事故相同的危险现象。本文提出了一种在工业风险分析中综合考虑安全性和保障性的新方法。这种方法结合了蝴蝶结分析,通常用于安全分析,与一个新的扩展版本的攻击树分析,介绍了工业控制系统的安全分析。结合使用蝴蝶结和攻击树提供了一个详尽的表示风险的情况下,在安全和保障。然后,我们提出了一种方法来评估风险水平的基础上两个长期的可能性部分,一个安全性和安全性。这种方法的应用证明了使用的案例研究的风险情况下,在一个化学设施。(C)2017爱思唯尔有限公司版权所有
The introduction of connected systems and digital technology in process industries creates new cyber-security vulnerabilities that can be exploited by sophisticated threats and lead to undesirable safety accidents. Thus, identifying these vulnerabilities during risk analysis becomes an important part for effective industrial risk evaluation. However, nowadays, safety and security are analyzed separately when they should not be. This is because a security threat can lead to the same dangerous phenomenon as a safety incident. In this paper, a new method that considers safety and security together during industrial risk analysis is proposed. This approach combines bowtie analysis, commonly used for safety analysis, with a new extended version of attack tree analysis, introduced for security analysis of industrial control systems. The combined use of bowtie and attack tree provides an exhaustive representation of risk scenarios in terms of safety and security. We then propose an approach for evaluating the risk level based on two-term likelihood parts, one for safety and one for security. The application of this approach is demonstrated using the case study of a risk scenario in a chemical facility. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.