Foundations of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Foundations of Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
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DOI：
10.1137/1.9781611977554.ch150
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发表时间：
2021-11
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Hao Chung;E. Shi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Hao Chung;E. Shi
在比特币和以太等区块链中，用户在交易费拍卖中竞争，以确保他们的交易在下一个区块得到确认。最近的一系列著作阐述了对“梦想”交易费用机制(TFM)的渴望，并探索了这种机制是否存在。理想的TFM应该满足1)用户激励相容，即诚实竞价应该是用户的主导策略；2)矿工激励相容，即矿工的主导策略是忠实执行规定的机制；3)矿工-用户侧合同有效性，即矿工和一个或多个用户(S)的任何联盟都不能通过偏离诚实行为来增加他们的联合效用。SCP的最弱形式被称为1-SCP，我们的目标只是针对矿工和单个用户的共谋提供弹性。遗憾的是，尽管进行了各种尝试，但就我们所知，没有一种现有机制能够在所有情况下满足所有这三个属性。由于TFM在建模和假设方面与经典的机构设计有所不同，到目前为止，我们对设计空间的了解还相对较少。在本文中，我们通过证明以下结果进一步解开了交易费用机制设计的数学结构：-我们能有梦想吗？-对激励相容概念的再思考。-新的设计元素是否会有所不同？
In blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, users compete in a transaction fee auction to get their transactions confirmed in the next block. A line of recent works set forth the desiderata for a"dream"transaction fee mechanism (TFM), and explored whether such a mechanism existed. A dream TFM should satisfy 1) user incentive compatibility (UIC), i.e., truthful bidding should be a user's dominant strategy; 2) miner incentive compatibility (MIC), i.e., the miner's dominant strategy is to faithfully implement the prescribed mechanism; and 3) miner-user side contract proofness (SCP), i.e., no coalition of the miner and one or more user(s) can increase their joint utility by deviating from the honest behavior. The weakest form of SCP is called 1-SCP, where we only aim to provide resilience against the collusion of the miner and a single user. Sadly, despite the various attempts, to the best of knowledge, no existing mechanism can satisfy all three properties in all situations. Since the TFM departs from classical mechanism design in modeling and assumptions, to date, our understanding of the design space is relatively little. In this paper, we further unravel the mathematical structure of transaction fee mechanism design by proving the following results: - Can we have a dream TFM? - Rethinking the incentive compatibility notions. - Do the new design elements make a difference?