Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception
Imagination, Delusion, and Self-Deception
复制标题
想象力、妄想和自欺欺人
DOI:
10.4324/9780203838044
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发表时间:
2008
影响因子:
9.1
通讯作者:
Jordi Fernández
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
T. Bayne;Jordi Fernández
Introduction Subjects with delusions profess to believe some extremely peculiar things. Patients with Capgras delusion sincerely assert that, for example, their spouses have been replaced by impostors. Patients with Cotard’s delusion sincerely assert that they are dead. Many philosophers and psychologists are hesitant to say that delusional subjects genuinely believe the contents of their delusions. One way to reinterpret delusional subjects is to say that we’ve misidentified the content of the problematic belief. So for example, rather than believing that his wife is has been replaced by an impostor, we might say that the victim of Capgras delusion believes that it is, in some respects, as if his wife has been replaced by an impostor. Another is to say that we’ve misidentified the attitude that the delusional subject bears to the content of their delusion. So for example, Gregory Currie and co-authors have suggested that rather than believing that his wife has been replaced by an impostor, we should say that the victim of Capgras delusion merely imagines that his wife has been replaced by an impostor. In this paper, I will explore a strategy of this second sort. Saying that the attitude that delusional subjects bear to the contents of their delusions is imagination, though, faces its own problems. I want to suggest that, instead, we ought to say that delusional
影响因子:
7.6
作者:
Sackeim,HA;Gur,RC
通讯作者:
Gur,RC