Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness
Belief-Free Rationalizability and Informational Robustness
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无信念合理性和信息稳健性
DOI：
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
S. Morris
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
D. Bergemann;S. Morris
我们提出了一种不完全信息的合理化模拟。如果一个操作在接下来的迭代删除过程中幸存下来，那么它就是无信念的、合理的。在每个阶段，我们都会删除某些类型的玩家的行动，这些行动不是对某些猜测的最佳回应，这些猜测只重视其他玩家类型的概况和该类型认为可能的状态，并结合那些迄今为止幸存下来的类型的行动。我们描述了一些应用。这个解决方案概念描述了均衡的含义，即玩家已知拥有一些私人信息，但可能拥有额外信息。因此，它回答了“信息稳健性”问题，即如果玩家观察到一些额外信息，我们对贝叶斯博弈均衡中可能出现的结果集能说些什么。
We propose an incomplete information analogue of rationalizability. An action is said to be belief-free rationalizable if it survives the following iterated deletion process. At each stage, we delete actions for a type of a player that are not a best response to some conjecture that puts weight only on profiles of types of other players and states that that type thinks possible, combined with actions of those types that have survived so far. We describe a number of applications. This solution concept characterizes the implications of equilibrium when a player is known to have some private information but may have additional information. It thus answers the "informational robustness" question of what can we say about the set of outcomes that may arise in equilibrium of a Bayesian game if players may observe some additional information.