Abreu–Matsushima Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence
Abreu–Matsushima Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence
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阿布鲁-松岛机制：实验证据
DOI：
10.1006/game.1996.0087
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发表时间：
1996
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Abdullah Yavas
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Martin Sefton;Abdullah Yavas
摘要 Abreu-Matsushima 机制可以应用于广泛的博弈类别，以将任何期望的结果作为独特的合理化结果。我们进行了实验，研究这种机制在两个简单的协调游戏中的性能。在这些博弈中，一种纯策略均衡是“焦点”；我们评估了 Abreu-Matsushima 机制实施其他纯策略均衡结果的有效性。阿布鲁-松岛机制诱导一些与期望结果一致的选择，但更多的选择反映了焦点结果。此外，当期望的结果是帕累托主导的风险主导均衡时，“强化”该机制会产生相反的效果。经济文献杂志分类号：C7。
Abstract Abreu–Matsushima mechanisms can be applied to a broad class of games to induce any desired outcome as the unique rationalizable outcome. We conduct experiments investigating the performance of such mechanisms in two simple coordination games. In these games one pure-strategy equilibrium is “focal”; we assess the efficacy of Abreu–Matsushima mechanisms for implementing the other pure-strategy equilibrium outcome. Abreu–Matsushima mechanisms induce some choices consistent with the desired outcome, but more choices reflect the focal outcome. Moreover, “strengthening” the mechanism has a perverse effect when the desired outcome is a Pareto-dominated risk-dominated equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C7.