Credible Sales Mechanisms and Intermediaries
Credible Sales Mechanisms and Intermediaries
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可信的销售机制和中介机构
DOI：
10.1257/aer.97.1.260
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Schwarz
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
David McAdams;M. Schwarz;M. Schwarz
我们考虑一个卖家面对几个买家，并且无法通过一个机构来完成销售。如果买方预期卖方可能会进一步谈判，他们宁愿等待，然后再提出最好的和最终的报价。这反过来又诱使卖方与买方进行长时间的讨价还价，即使这样做代价高昂。当卖方征求另一轮报价的成本非常大或非常小时，卖方会合理地承诺进行拍卖，并经历可以忽略不计的讨价还价成本。否则，可能会有几轮不断增加的报价和重大的卖方损失。在这些情况下，具有足够有价值的声誉和/或价格边际激励较弱的中介可以通过可信地承诺帮助毫不拖延地出售物品来创造价值。(JEL C78、D44）
We consider a seller who faces several buyers and lacks access to an institution to credibly close a sale. If buyers anticipate that the seller may negotiate further, they will prefer to wait before making their best and final offers. This in turn induces the seller to bargain at length with buyers, even if doing so is costly. When the seller's cost of soliciting another round of offers is either very large or very small, the seller credibly commits to an auction and experiences negligible bargaining costs. Otherwise, there may be several rounds of increasing offers and significant seller losses. In these situations, an intermediary with a sufficiently valuable reputation and/or weak marginal incentives regarding price can create value by credibly committing to help sell the object without delay. (JEL C78, D44)