A Note on Cheap Talk and Burned Money

A Note on Cheap Talk and Burned Money
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关于廉价言论和烧钱的注释

DOI:
10.2139/ssrn.794225
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发表时间:
2006
期刊:
Microeconomic Theory eJournal
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
Navin Kartik
Navin Kartik
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Navin Kartik

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Austen-Smith和Banks(Journal of Economic Theory,2000)研究了烧钱如何扩展Crawford和Sobel(Econometrica,1982)的纯廉价谈话均衡。本文指出了奥斯汀-史密斯和班克斯的主要定理中的一个错误,并提供了一个变体,保留了一些重要的含义。我还证明,一般来说,廉价的谈话可以在烧钱的情况下有影响力,当且仅当它可以在不烧钱的情况下有影响力。这大大加强了奥斯汀-史密斯和班克斯的一个结果,但同时也揭示了他们分析中的其他错误。最后,证明了他们关于当烧钱上界收缩到0时均衡集连续性的猜想是正确的。
Austen-Smith and Banks (Journal of Economic Theory, 2000) study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica, 1982). This note identifies an error in the main Theorem of Austen-Smith and Banks, and provides a variant that preserves some of the important implications. I also prove that generically, cheap talk can be influential in the presence of money burning if and only if it can be influential without money burning. This considerably strengthens a result of Austen-Smith and Banks, but simultaneously uncovers other errors in their analysis. Finally, their conjecture on the continuity of the equilibrium set as the upper bound on burned money shrinks to 0 is proved correct.