A Reason-Based Theory of Rational Choice
A Reason-Based Theory of Rational Choice
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0068.2011.00840.x
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发表时间：
2013-03-01
期刊：
影响因子：
2.1
通讯作者：
List, Christian
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dietrich, Franz;List, Christian
在正式的理性选择理论和关于理性的哲学工作之间存在着令人惊讶的脱节。前者对理性选择中理性的作用保持沉默，后者很少涉及社会科学家所使用的决策问题的正式模型。为了弥补这一差距，我们提出了一种新的、基于理性的理性选择理论。它的核心是对偏好形成的解释，根据这种解释，一个人的偏好是由他或她的激励原因决定的，以及不同原因组合之间的权衡关系。通过解释一个人的偏好如何随着他或她的动机的变化而变化，我们的理论阐明了对理由的深思熟虑和理性选择之间的关系。虽然主要是积极的，但该理论也可以帮助我们思考这些偏好和选择应该如何回应规范性原因。
There is a surprising disconnect between formal rational choice theory and philosophical work on reasons. The one is silent on the role of reasons in rational choices, the other rarely engages with the formal models of decision problems used by social scientists. To bridge this gap, we propose a new, reason-based theory of rational choice. At its core is an account of preference formation, according to which an agents preferences are determined by his or her motivating reasons, together with a weighing relation between different combinations of reasons. By explaining how someones preferences may vary with changes in his or her motivating reasons, our theory illuminates the relationship between deliberation about reasons and rational choices. Although primarily positive, the theory can also help us think about how those preferences and choices ought to respond to normative reasons.