The optimal sequence of prices and auctions
The optimal sequence of prices and auctions
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价格和拍卖的最佳顺序
DOI：
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2021.103681
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
2.8
通讯作者：
Zhang, Hanzhe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Zhang, Hanzhe
为了在最后期限前卖出一件商品，垄断者在公布价格和每个时期进行一次代价高昂的保留价拍卖之间做出选择。具有独立私人价值观的买家会随着时间的推移而到来。对于各种各样的拍卖成本，利润最大化机制的顺序是先公布价格，然后进行拍卖。价格，然后拍卖机制序列的最优性提供了一个新的理由，混合销售机制，允许“一口价”的选择之前，在eBay上的标准拍卖。
To sell a good before a deadline, a monopolist chooses between posting a price and running a costly reserve-price auction each period. Buyers with independent private values arrive over time. For a wide range of auction costs, the profit-maximizing mechanism sequence is to post prices first and then to run auctions. The optimality of the prices-then-auctions mechanism sequence provides a new justification for the hybrid sales mechanism of allowing the “Buy It Now” option before a standard auction on eBay.