A computational model of consciousness for artificial emotional agents

A computational model of consciousness for artificial emotional agents
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人工情感主体的意识计算模型

DOI:
10.11621/pir.2017.0304
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发表时间:
2017
期刊:
Psychology in Russia
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
A. Kotov
A. Kotov
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
A. Kotov

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背景。意识结构长期以来一直是认知科学的基石问题。最近它在计算机代理和移动机器人的设计中具有应用意义。因此,这个问题可以从哲学、神经心理学和计算机建模的角度来审视。客观的。在本文中,我们通过设计旨在模拟“言语理解”和反讽的计算机代理来解决意识计算模型的问题。此外,我们寻找一种能够模拟计算系统中意识影响的“最小架构”。方法。对于基础架构,我们使用了软件代理,该代理被编程为使用脚本(产生式或推理)进行操作,通过提取语义表示来处理传入文本(或事件),并选择相关反应。结果。结果表明,智能体可以通过用积极的讽刺话语代替直接的攻击行为来模拟言语讽刺。这是通过平衡代理可用的多个脚本来实现的。我们建议该方案的扩展可以作为意识的最小架构,其中代理区分自己的表征和其他代理的潜在认知表征。在该架构中,有两个处理阶段。首先,代理通过将 if 语句或操作(推理)置于处理范围内来激活多个脚本。其次,代理根据脚本被另一个脚本的激活来区分脚本。这种多级方案允许智能体模拟想象的情况、自己的想象的行为以及其他智能体的想象的行为,即智能体表现出心灵哲学和认知心理学中被认为对有意识的智能体至关重要的特征。结论。我们用于理解言语和模拟讽刺的计算机系统可以作为进一步模拟意识影响的基础。
Background. The structure of consciousness has long been a cornerstone problem in the cognitive sciences. Recently it took on applied significance in the design of computer agents and mobile robots. This problem can thus be examined from perspectives of philosophy, neuropsychology, and computer modeling. objective. In the present paper, we address the problem of the computational model of consciousness by designing computer agents aimed at simulating “speech understanding” and irony. Further, we look for a “minimal architecture” that is able to mimic the effects of consciousness in computing systems. method. For the base architecture, we used a software agent, which was programmed to operate with scripts (productions or inferences), to process incoming texts (or events) by extracting their semantic representations, and to select relevant reactions. Results. It is shown that the agent can simulate speech irony by replacing a direct aggressive behavior with a positive sarcastic utterance. This is achieved by balancing between several scripts available to the agent. We suggest that the extension of this scheme may serve as a minimal architecture of consciousness, wherein the agent distinguishes own representations and potential cognitive representations of other agents. Within this architecture, there are two stages of processing. First, the agent activates several scripts by placing their if-statements or actions (inferences) within a processing scope. Second, the agent differentiates the scripts depending on their activation by another script. This multilevel scheme allows the agent to simulate imaginary situations, one’s own imaginary actions, and imaginary actions of other agents, i.e. the agent demonstrates features considered essential for conscious agents in the philosophy of mind and cognitive psychology. conclusion. Our computer systems for understanding speech and simulation of irony can serve as a basis for further modeling of the effects of consciousness.