When both states and markets fail: asymmetric information and the role of NGOs in African health care
When both states and markets fail: asymmetric information and the role of NGOs in African health care
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DOI：
10.1016/s0144-8188(02)00069-8
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发表时间：
2002-07-01
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Leonard, KL
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Leonard, KL
在非洲的医疗保健领域，“市场奇迹”尚未出现。病人愿意为优质的医疗服务付费，但优秀的私人医生却无法出售他们的服务。与此同时，非政府组织正在成功地管理病人愿意付费的保健设施。我们使用一个模型的存在下，不对称的信息，使我们能够查看非洲的卫生保健的新制度经济学文献的框架中的卫生保健的需求。我们验证了这一观点的经验，并表明，非政府组织提供高质量的医疗保健的机构能力。同时，我们表明，无论是私人执业者还是收取费用的正规政府机构都不会轻易成功。(C)2002年爱思唯尔科技有限公司All rights reserved.
In African health care the "miracle of the market" has not occurred. Patients exhibit willingness to pay for quality health care and yet good private practitioners are unable to sell their services. Simultaneously nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are running successful health facilities for which patients are willing to pay. We use a model of the demand for health care in the presence of asymmetric information that allows us to view African health care in the framework of the New Institutional Economics literature. We validate this view empirically and show that NGOs have the institutional capacity to deliver high quality health care. We show that at the same time, neither private practitioners nor regular government organizations charging fees will easily succeed. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.