Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
复制标题
超级博弈中的强完美均衡
DOI:
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发表时间:
1980
期刊:
影响因子:
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通讯作者:
A. Rubinstein
中科院分区:
文献类型:
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作者:
A. Rubinstein
The set of payoffs for the strong equilibria is characterized for supergames when the evaluation relations are according to the limit of the means and where no coalition can correlate its strategies in a randomized way.It is proven that this set is identical to the set of payoffs of the strong perfect equilibria. On the other hand an example is given to demonstrate that perfection is a significant notion in supergames where the evaluation relations are according to the overtaking criterion.