The Role of Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with Liquidity Constraints and Moral Hazard
The Role of Unemployment Insurance in an Economy with Liquidity Constraints and Moral Hazard
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DOI：
10.1086/261809
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发表时间：
1992-02
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
G. Hansen;A. Imrohoroglu
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Hansen;A. Imrohoroglu
本文利用一个定量动态一般均衡模型，研究了失业保险的潜在福利效益及其最优替代率的沿着。为了发挥失业保险的作用，我们经济中的代理人面临着外部的特殊就业冲击，无法通过私人市场借款或投保。在不存在道德风险的情况下，高达0.65的替代率是最优的，失业保险的福利待遇相当大。然而，如果存在道德风险，并且替代率没有被设定为最优，而是被设定为一个经验上合理的值，那么经济可能会比没有失业保险的情况更糟。
The potential welfare benefits of unemployment insurance, along with the optimal replacement ratio, are studied using a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model. To provide a role for unemployment insurance, agents in our economy face exogenous idiosyncratic employment shocks and are unable to borrow or insure themselves through private markets. In the absence of moral hazard, replacement ratios as high as .65 are optimal and the welfare benefits of unemployment insurance are quite large. However, if there is moral hazard and the replacement ratio is not set optimally, but is instead set to an empirically plausible value, the economy can be much worse off than it would be without unemployment insurance.