The Presocratic Philosophers
The Presocratic Philosophers
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前苏格拉底哲学家
DOI：
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发表时间：
1959
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
J. Raven
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
G. Vlastos;G. Kirk;J. Raven
对于的每一个值，都不可能既不是也不是。亚里士多德，几乎不用说，很清楚这一点（参见，例如，在一个实施例中，GC 329a10）。但是，如果“无限”不是完全没有特征，那么它的特征是什么呢？在几个段落中，亚里士多德谈到phusiologoi，他把其他元素“之间”（metaxu）的东西作为他们的原则;他可能想到了阿那克西曼德。根据一些学者的说法，泰奥弗拉斯托斯认为阿那克西曼德的原理是所有物质的“混合物”（migma）。这些段落都是有争议的，但有一件事是相当清楚的：如果逍遥学派真的把metaxu或migma理论归因于阿那克西曼德，他们是在黑暗中吹口哨。阿那克西曼德的文本没有给他们任何启示;我猜他们不知道阿那克西曼德在想什么，因为阿那克西曼德自己也不知道该想什么。在（8）中，论证（C）假设宇宙的空间无限。这个命题是论证（B）的结论。这个论点是无效的，正如亚里士多德所指出的：为了使存在不会失败，没有必要存在一个实际上是无限的可感觉的身体。一件事的过去可能是另一件事的到来，整体是有限的”（物理学208 a7 -10）。这个反对意见可以通过在（B）中增加另一个前提来克服，即：（18）现存事物的毁灭所提供的材料不能用于新事物的产生。但把（18）归于阿那克西曼德是不可信的。这段文字的第四句，不管它是否是阿那克西的，严格地说，并不与第十八句不相容：第四句并不意味着摧毁一个事物所产生的尘埃，在质量上等于它产生时所消耗的尘埃;想象产生和毁灭的过程涉及某种物质的浪费，也不是完全不可能的。然而，句子[v]相当强烈地表明，阿那克西曼德心中有某种平等的平衡;他很可能会拒绝（18）。论证（B）可以在没有（18）的帮助下得到修正;代替（18），我们可以加上：（19）现存事物的质量是不断增加的。（19）的一个追随者相信宇宙正在膨胀;没有直接证据表明任何前苏格拉底派持有这样的信念。但是，阿那克萨哥拉有一句话显然使他相信宇宙是膨胀的;至少在某些方面，阿那克萨哥拉是一个科学的传统主义者。如果阿那克萨哥拉拥抱（19），也许他是从阿那克西曼德那里拿来的。在这里，引用阿那克西曼德的学生阿那克西美尼的一段话是很恰当的：空气接近不朽之物;既然我们是由空气的流出而产生的，它就必须是无限的和丰富的，因为它永远不会流出（18：13 B 3）。前苏格拉底哲学家26
cannot be neither nor nonfor every value of . Aristotle, it need hardly be said, was well aware of this (cf., e.g., GC 329a10). But if the ‘unlimited’ was not entirely characterless, what was its character? In several passages Aristotle talks of phusiologoi who took as their principle a stuff ‘between’ (metaxu) the other elements; and he probably had Anaximander in mind. According to some scholars, Theophrastus thought that Anaximander’s principle was a ‘mixture’ (migma) of all stuffs. These passages are all controversial, but one thing is fairly clear: if the Peripatetics did actually ascribe a metaxu or a migma theory to Anaximander, they were whistling in the dark. Anaximander’s text gave them no light; and I guess that they did not know what Anaximander thought, for the excellent reason that Anaximander himself did not know what to think. Argument (C) assumes, in (8), the spatial infinity of the universe. That proposition is the conclusion of argument (B). The argument is invalid, as Aristotle points out: In order that coming to be should not fail, it is not necessary that there should be a sensible body which is actually unlimited. The passing away of one thing may be the coming to be of another, the whole being limited’ (Phys 208a7–10). This objection is overcome by adding a further premiss to (B), viz: (18) The material supplied by the destruction of existing things cannot be used in the generation of new things. But it is implausible to ascribe (18) to Anaximander. Sentence [iv] of the fragment, whether or not it is Anaximandrian, is not, strictly speaking, incompatible with (18): [iv] does not imply that the dust produced by destroying a thing is equal in mass to the dust consumed in its generation; and it is not grossly implausible to imagine that the processes of generation and destruction involve a certain wastage of stuff. Sentence [v], however, suggests fairly strongly that Anaximander had some sort of equal balancing in mind; and the probability is that he would have rejected (18). Argument (B) can be repaired without the help of (18); instead of (18) we may add: (19) The mass of existing things is perpetually increasing. An adherent of (19) believes that the cosmos is expanding; and there is no direct evidence that any Presocratic held such a belief. But there is a sentence from Anaxagoras which apparently commits him to an expanding universe; and in some respects at least Anaxagoras was a scientific traditionalist. If Anaxagoras embraced (19), perhaps he took it from Anaximander. It is pertinent to quote here a fragment of Anaximander’s pupil, Anaximenes: Air is close to the incorporeal; and since we come into being by an effluxion of this, it is necessary for it to be both unlimited and rich, because it never gives out (18:13 B 3). The presocratic philosophers 26