The Social Utility of Informal Institutions
The Social Utility of Informal Institutions
复制标题
非正式制度的社会效用
DOI：
10.1177/1532673x09337183
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发表时间：
2009
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
N. Ringe
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
J. Victor;N. Ringe
本文对立法核心小组的现有知识提出了挑战，认为核心小组制度反映并加强了政党和委员会等正式组织机构，而不是抵消它们。我们认为，立法者参与核心小组制度是为了最大限度地发挥其关系的社会效用。使用社交网络框架，我们开发并测试假设，旨在确定在核心小组网络中担任较高职位的立法者类型。我们收集了第 110 届美国众议院第一届会议的核心小组及其成员的全部数据，并进行社交网络分析，以寻找核心小组系统支持现有正式机构的等级结构的证据。
This article challenges the existing state-of-knowledge about legislative caucuses by arguing that the caucus system reflects and reinforces formal organizing institutions, such as parties and committees, rather than counterbalancing them. We argue that legislators engage in the caucus system to maximize the social utility of their relationships. Using a social network framework, we develop and test hypotheses that seek to ascertain the types of legislators that assume elevated positions in the caucus network. We collect data on the complete population of caucuses and their members from the first session of the 110th U.S. House of Representatives and conduct social network analyses to find evidence that the caucus system supports the hierarchical structure of existing formal institutions.