Equilibrium locations in a mixed duopoly with sequential entry in real time
Equilibrium locations in a mixed duopoly with sequential entry in real time
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DOI：
10.1016/j.econmod.2010.12.009
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发表时间：
2011-05
影响因子：
4.7
通讯作者：
Changying Li;Jianhu Zhang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Changying Li;Jianhu Zhang
我们研究了一个混合双寡头模型，其中一个上市公司和一个私人公司在一个无限的时间范围内顺序进入一个市场，有和没有不确定性的追随者的进入日期。我们假设有一个单位长度的线性城市，并表明，如果上市公司首先移动，均衡位置福尔斯内的第二和第三四分位数。预期跟随者进入的时间越晚，两家公司就越接近。然而，如果私人公司首先采取行动，它会积极地位于中间点（二分之一），迫使上市公司位于更接近边缘（六分之一），以最大限度地减少消费者的运输成本。此外，当公共企业作为领导者移动时，社会福利严格地更大。
We investigate a mixed duopoly model where a public firm and a private firm enter a market sequentially over an infinite time horizon, with and without uncertainty over the follower's entry date. We assume that there is a unit-length linear city and show that, if the public firm moves first, equilibrium location falls inside the second and third quartiles. The later the follower is expected to enter, the closer the two firms are. However, if the private firm acts first, it moves aggressively to locate at the middle point (one-half), forcing the public firm to locate nearer the periphery (one-sixth), to minimize consumers' transportation cost. In addition, social welfare is strictly greater when the public firm moves as the leader.