Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Constitutional Choices
Tiebout with Politics: Capital Tax Competition and Constitutional Choices
复制标题
蒂布特与政治：资本税竞争和宪法选择
DOI：
10.1111/1467-937x.00163
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发表时间：
2001
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
K. Scharf
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Carlo Perroni;K. Scharf
本文考察了资本税竞争如何影响管辖权的形成。我们描述了一个公共物品提供选择的非合作区位模型，其中税收水平和在司法管辖区内提供的地方公共物品品种是由多数投票选择的，而均衡司法管辖区由具有相似品味的消费者组成。我们表明，司法管辖区间的税收竞争导致了司法管辖区边界的扩大，即使在没有司法管辖区内转移的情况下，也可以提高司法管辖区所有成员的福利。
This paper examines how capital tax competition affects jurisdiction formation. We describe a non-cooperative locational model of public goods provision choices, where the levels of taxation and the local public good varieties provided within jurisdictions are selected by majority voting, and where equilibrium jurisdictions consist of consumers with similar tastes. We show that interjurisdictional tax competition results in an enlargement of jurisdictional boundaries, and, even in the absence of intrajurisdictional transfers, can raise welfare for all members of a jurisdiction.