Securing Infrastructure Facilities: When Does Proactive Defense Help?
Securing Infrastructure Facilities: When Does Proactive Defense Help?
复制标题
确保基础设施安全：主动防御何时有用？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2018
影响因子：
1.5
通讯作者：
Saurabh Amin
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Manxi Wu;Saurabh Amin
基础设施系统正日益面临新的安全威胁，因为支持其运行的网络物理组件存在漏洞。在这篇文章中，我们研究了基础设施运营商（防御者）应该如何优先考虑保护一组设施的投资，以减少战略对手（攻击者）的影响，这些攻击者可以针对设施来增加系统的整体使用成本。我们采用博弈论的方法来模拟防御者和攻击者之间的互动，并研究了两个模型：正常形式的游戏，其中两个球员都不情愿地移动和顺序游戏，其中攻击者在观察防守者的策略后移动。对于每一个模型，我们提供了一个完整的特征，如何设置的设施，由防御者在平衡中的攻击和防御的成本变化。重要的是，我们的分析提供了一个尖锐的条件有关的成本参数，防御者具有先发优势。具体来说，我们表明，为了完全阻止攻击者瞄准任何设施，防御者需要以适当的努力水平主动保护所有“脆弱的设施”。我们说明了一个简单的运输网络上的攻击者-防御者的相互作用的结果。我们还建议一个动态的学习设置，以了解这种结果如何影响不完全知情的用户在攻击后阶段使用系统的决定的能力。
Infrastructure systems are increasingly facing new security threats due to the vulnerabilities of cyber-physical components that support their operation. In this article, we investigate how the infrastructure operator (defender) should prioritize the investment in securing a set of facilities in order to reduce the impact of a strategic adversary (attacker) who can target a facility to increase the overall usage cost of the system. We adopt a game-theoretic approach to model the defender-attacker interaction and study two models: normal form game—where both players move simultaneously—and sequential game—where attacker moves after observing the defender’s strategy. For each model, we provide a complete characterization of how the set of facilities that are secured by the defender in equilibrium vary with the costs of attack and defense. Importantly, our analysis provides a sharp condition relating the cost parameters for which the defender has the first-mover advantage. Specifically, we show that to fully deter the attacker from targeting any facility, the defender needs to proactively secure all “vulnerable facilities” at an appropriate level of effort. We illustrate the outcome of the attacker–defender interaction on a simple transportation network. We also suggest a dynamic learning setup to understand how this outcome can affect the ability of imperfectly informed users to make their decisions about using the system in the post-attack stage.
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-319-12601-2_15
发表时间：
2014
期刊：
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影响因子：
--
作者：
Panaousis E
通讯作者：
Panaousis E