Does everyone have a price? On the role of payoff magnitude for ethical decision making

Does everyone have a price? On the role of payoff magnitude for ethical decision making
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DOI:
10.1016/j.cognition.2017.02.011
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发表时间:
2017-06-01
期刊:
影响因子:
3.4
通讯作者:
Thielmann, Isabel
Thielmann, Isabel
中科院分区:
心理学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Hilbig, Benjamin E.;Thielmann, Isabel

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大多数研究不诚实行为的方法都强调相应回报的重要性,这通常意味着不诚实行为可能会随着激励的增加而增加。然而,先前的证据似乎并不能证实这种直觉。然而,现存的研究结果是基于相对较小的回报,其潜在影响仅在参与者之间进行分析。在两个实验中,我们使用了不同的多试验模具滚动范式,旨在调查个人层面的不诚实(即,在参与者内部),并作为利益的函数----实施超过100标准收入分类的实质性激励。结果表明,激励规模确实对道德决策有影响,尽管主要是针对两个子集:“易腐败的人”(他们欺骗得越多)和“小罪人”(随着潜在收益的增加,他们倾向于欺骗得越少)。其他人(“厚颜无耻的骗子”)愿意为几乎任何非零的激励而作弊,而还有一些人(“诚实的人”)根本不作弊,即使是为了大的回报。这意味着,当对参与者进行分析时,回报大小对道德决策的影响往往是模糊的,而且回报的诱惑力不够。(C)2017爱思唯尔B. V.保留所有权利。
Most approaches to dishonest behavior emphasize the importance of corresponding payoffs, typically implying that dishonesty might increase with increasing incentives. However, prior evidence does not appear to confirm this intuition. However, extant findings are based on relatively small payoffs, the potential effects of which are solely analyzed across participants. In two experiments, we used different multi-trial die-rolling paradigms designed to investigate dishonesty at the individual level (i.e., within participants) and as a function of the payoffs at stake - implementing substantial incentives exceeding 100sic. Results show that incentive sizes indeed matter for ethical decision making, though primarily for two subsets of "corruptible individuals" (who cheat more the more they are offered) and "small sinners" (who tend to cheat less as the potential payoffs increase). Others ("brazen liars") are willing to cheat for practically any non-zero incentive whereas still others ("honest individuals") do not cheat at all, even for large payoffs. By implication, the influence of payoff magnitude on ethical decision making is often obscured when analyzed across participants and with insufficiently tempting payoffs. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.