The Economics of Bitcoin Transaction Fees
The Economics of Bitcoin Transaction Fees
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2400519
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发表时间：
2014-02
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
N. Houy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
N. Houy
我们在一个简单的静态局部均衡模型中研究了比特币交易费的经济学，具体是系统安全与矿工的总计算能力直接相关。我们证明了任何一种固定费用的情况都等价于另一种有限区块大小的情况。在这两种情况下，我们都给出了交易费用或区块大小的最佳值。我们还表明，将区块大小作为非约束性限制，同时让费用作为去中心化竞争市场的结果而固定，并不能保证比特币的长期存在。
We study the economics of Bitcoin transaction fees in a simple static partial equilibrium model with the specificity that the system security is directly linked to the total computational power of miners. We show that any situation with a fixed fee is equivalent to another situation with a limited block size. In both cases, we give the optimal value of the transaction fee or of the block size. We also show that making the block size a non binding constraint and, in the same time, letting the fee be fixed as the outcome of a decentralized competitive market cannot guarantee the very existence of Bitcoin in the long-term.