A Classically-Based Theory of Impossible Worlds
A Classically-Based Theory of Impossible Worlds
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基于经典的不可能世界理论
DOI：
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发表时间：
1997
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通讯作者：
E. Zalta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
E. Zalta
模态逻辑的语义学中对可能世界的呼吁和对可能世界作为本体论的基本要素的哲学辩护，导致哲学家和逻辑学家引入其他类型的“世界”，以研究各种哲学和逻辑现象。这些文献包含了对“非正常世界”、“非经典世界”、“非标准世界”和“不可能世界”的讨论。这些非典型世界被用于以下方面：（1）解释不寻常的模态逻辑，（2）区分逻辑上等价的命题，（3）解决与命题态度语境、意向语境和具有不可能前件的反事实相关的问题，以及（4）解释相关和次协调逻辑系统。然而，那些试图为这种非典型世界发展一种真正的形而上学理论的人，往往会过快地从哲学表征转向形式语义学。例如，在Priest [1992]中可以找到发展这种理论的最佳尝试之一。在
The appeal to possible worlds in the semantics of modal logic and the philosophical defense of possible worlds as an essential element of ontology have led philosophers and logicians to introduce other kinds of ‘worlds’ in order to study various philosophical and logical phenomena. The literature contains discussions of ‘non-normal worlds’, ‘non-classical worlds’, ‘non-standard worlds’, and ‘impossible worlds’. These atypical worlds have been used in the following ways: (1) to interpret unusual modal logics, (2) to distinguish logically equivalent propositions, (3) to solve the problems associated with propositional attitude contexts, intentional contexts, and counterfactuals with impossible antecedents, and (4) to interpret systems of relevant and paraconsistent logic. However, those who have attempted to develop a genuine metaphysical theory of such atypical worlds tend to move too quickly from philosophical characterizations to formal semantics. For example, one of the best attempts to develop such a theory can be found in Priest [1992]. In